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in Sub-Saharan Africa
•
James Van Alstine*
Since the early 2000s, increased demand for raw materials, partly driven by the
growth of Asian economies, has fueled a global commodity boom.1 Energy and
non-energy mineral prices have rebounded quickly after the 2008–2010 reces-
sion.2 Higher commodity prices have spurred an increase in foreign direct in-
vestment into the world’s poorest economies, driving speculation that a “win-
dow of opportunity” exists for these mineral-rich but poor economies to
accelerate their development.3 Proponents of resource-led development (such
as host country governments, international ªnance institutions, and donor gov-
ernments) highlight the importance of resource extraction as a source of foreign
direct investment and foreign exchange, raw materials and energy, infrastructure
development, revenues, and poverty alleviation.4
However, the concept of resource-led development, namely, how the ex-
tractive industries can contribute to poverty alleviation in the developing world,
often fails to produce its promised beneªts in practice. Much of the work on re-
source extraction in developing countries examines the economic and political
aspects of the “resource curse,” the complex and somewhat paradoxical situa-
tion whereby countries with signiªcant levels of non-renewable natural re-
sources and therefore potential wealth often perform less well in terms of eco-
nomic, environmental, and human development performance than their peers.5
African economies dependent upon exploration of natural resources are charac-
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Workshop in September 2011 at the London School of Economics for their feedback. I am also
grateful for research assistance from Shawna Finnegan, and for helpful comments from Stavros
Aªonis, Lindsay Stringer, and three anonymous reviewers.
1. UNCTAD 2007; UNCTAD 2011.
2. UNCTAD 2011.
3. UNCTAD 2007, iii.
4. Humphreys et al. 2007; UNCTAD 2007.
5. Collier 2007; Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner 2001.
Global Environmental Politics 14:1, February 2014, doi:10.1162/GLEP_a_00213
© 2014 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
terized by poor economic growth, low living standards, corruption, and politi-
cal authoritarianism.6 With increasing concern about the negative impacts of
the extractive industries, a discursive shift is evident within the international
community and some resource-rich governments, which have increasingly em-
braced key norms such as transparency and information disclosure in relation
to the extraction of energy and non-energy minerals.
This paper explores how multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Extrac-
tive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Publish What You Pay (PWYP)
campaign have sought to institutionalize transparency in resource governance.
PWYP is a coalition of 650 civil society organizations that campaigns for trans-
parency in natural resource sectors as a way to combat corruption, reduce con-
ºict, and achieve resource-led development. These efforts helped to establish
the EITI in 2002. EITI is a voluntary global standard for disclosing company
payments and government revenues.
By exploring how, why, and to what effect transparency in resource gover-
nance has taken hold so rapidly in a new petro-economy such as Ghana, I high-
light two key ªndings: (1) the interaction between voluntary and mandatory
governance mechanisms and the rescaling of authority; and (2) the multi-scalar
dimensions of resource governance and subsequent lack of focus on sub-
national issues. Through the analysis of these themes, I critique the transforma-
tive potential of transparency in resource governance.
Ghana presents a unique case in the context of resource-rich sub-Saharan
Africa, given its positive development trajectory and commitment to democracy.
As demand for energy and non-energy minerals increases, reserves will be
exploited in more remote and technically, politically, socially, and environ-
mentally risky places. How resource governance evolves within a new petro-
economy in sub-Saharan Africa is highly relevant to analyze.
The analysis in this article draws on primary and secondary data collected
by myself and research collaborators during a Ghanaian research trip to Accra,
Tema, and the Western Region in July 2010; at the Fifth EITI Global Conference
in Paris, March 2011; and through telephone interviews with civil society leaders
in July and August 2011. Primary data include semi-structured interviews, focus
groups, and conference notes; secondary data include EITI country reports,
PWYP reports, media articles, NGO/think tank reports, corporate reports, and
government documents. Key stakeholders interviewed individually or in focus
groups include community leaders in the Western Region (n12); Western
Region District Assemblies (n6); media (n8); industry (n11); national
government ofªcials (n3); and civil society leaders (n6).7
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7. The data collected in 2010 focused on the impacts on local communities of the emerging petro-
leum sector in the Western Region. This led subsequently to a more general exploration of the
impacts of transparency in resource governance in Ghana.
The Rise of Transparency in Resource Governance
Transparency is “the opposite of secrecy.”8 It is an international norm driven by
advances in information and communication technologies as well as the trends
of democratization and globalization. Transparency challenges the traditional
norms of corporate privacy and state sovereignty and is invoked in many issue
areas including security, ªnancial policy, economics, corruption, human rights,
and the environment, prompting some to call it the “Swiss army knife of policy
tools.”9 This study considers transparency within the context of “governance by
disclosure,”10 which puts primacy on the provision of information as a “means
of social steering.”11
The “transparency turn” in environmental governance is well docu-
mented, particularly within the ªelds of state-led international environmental
regimes,12 non-state market-driven forms of governance,13 and national envi-
ronmental regulation.14 Environmental governance includes “hard” rules, such
as regulation, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms, as well as “soft” rules,
such as voluntary standards, norms, beliefs, and social understandings.15 This
paper builds on this literature, particularly relating to public–private modes of
informational governance. For the purposes of this article, resource governance
means the hard and soft rules that shape how hydrocarbons contribute to sus-
tainable development and poverty alleviation within host countries.
Intersecting Ideas and Key Events
The transparency within resource governance agenda has emerged since the late
1990s because of intersecting “ideas” promoted by transnational networks con-
cerned with corruption, conºict, and corporate social responsibility.16 NGOs,
often from the global North, wield signiªcant discursive power in diffusing and
institutionalizing transparency norms through agenda-setting and coalition-
building activities.17 Driven by NGO advocacy, the reputational concerns of
Western governments, international ªnancial institutions, and transnational ex-
tractive ªrms have also facilitated the emergence of this international agenda.18
The 1999 Global Witness report, A Crude Awakening, which highlighted
the role of the oil and banking industries in the plundering of state assets during
Angola’s forty-year war, was a key event in setting the agenda for transparency in
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resource governance.19 In response to rising criticism, and in the run-up to the
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, nine major min-
ing companies implemented an independent project known as the Mining Min-
erals and Sustainable Development Project during 2000–2002 to assess the con-
tribution of the minerals sector to sustainable development.20 Although this
initiative was “reformist in tone and criticized by activist groups,” it marked the
beginning of an ongoing dialogue on the extractive industry’s contribution to
sustainable development.21
The Extractive Industries Review of the World Bank Group (WBG), under-
taken between 2001 and 2004, also provided insight into the institutionaliza-
tion of the transparency in resource governance agenda. The review was initi-
ated because of protest over the World Bank’s poor resource-led development
track record. It sought to evaluate whether extractive industry projects could be
compatible with the WBG’s goals of sustainable development and poverty re-
duction.22 Critics have highlighted how bank ofªcials were unwilling to accept
several of the review’s recommendations. However, others have noted that it
subjected the WBG “to levels of scrutiny from which it would be difªcult to turn
back.”23
Transparency in the payment and receipt of natural resource revenues in
fact emerged in the review “as one of the few issues that everyone could agree
on.”24 The review supported the EITI over donor conditionality and mandatory
private sector rules. Some felt that the WBG’s focus on the EITI’s voluntary ap-
proach sought to deºect criticism away from the review, and to focus the
resource-led development debate towards developing country host govern-
ments.25
The Emergence of PWYP and the EITI
The PWYP campaign formally began in 2002 as an alliance of six London-based
NGOs, including Global Witness, Open Society Institute, Catholic Agency for
Overseas Development (CAFOD), Oxfam GB, Save the Children UK, and Trans-
parency International UK.26 The initiative has evolved into a global network of
more than 650 civil society organizations in over 50 countries, and has been
inºuential in advocating for mandatory extractive industry transparency rules. It
calls for mandatory transparency of company payments and government reve-
nues, government expenditures, and contracts and licensing procedures in the
extractive industries. The ªrst advocacy objective listed on the PWYP website is
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26. Van Oranje and Parham 2009.
supporting the EITI at the international and national levels, and it does so
through having PWYP members participate in the EITI board of directors
and through its national coalitions.
Following its launch in 2002, the EITI has evolved into a voluntary inter-
national standard with a secretariat based in Oslo. It seeks to strengthen trans-
parency and accountability through the disclosure of company payments and
government revenues. As of June 2013, the EITI was supported by thirty-nine
countries (twenty-three compliant and sixteen candidate countries), over sev-
enty companies, and a wide variety of other stakeholders including NGOs, in-
ternational ªnance institutions, and academic partners.27 In contrast to other
forms of non-state market-driven governance, the EITI is implemented by par-
ticipating countries. Where some certiªcation schemes (e.g., the Forest Steward-
ship Council) may forbid direct government involvement,28 government com-
mitment and participation in implementing the EITI are critical to its success.
The EITI and PWYP act as key catalysts in mainstreaming international
consensus in favor of transparency in the extractives sector. As Table 1 high-
lights, the two initiatives are complementary yet distinct. As of June 2013, the
EITI had focused quite narrowly on seeking voluntary publication and veriª-
cation of company payments and government revenues from the extractives sec-
tor. However, it is now in the process of transitioning from the EITI Rules agreed
to in 2011 to the EITI Standard adopted in May 2013. Among other things, the
new standard will require new disclosure requirements, better linkages to wider
reforms, and a minimum level of performance for all participating countries.29
PWYP broadens the remit still further by engaging more directly with trans-
parency in other areas of the extractive industries value chain30 and calling on
companies and governments to make these transparency interventions manda-
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27. EITI 2013.
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30. The World Bank conceptualizes the extractive industries value chain to include ªve core compo-
nents: contracts and licensing; regulation and monitoring operations; taxation and royalties;
Table 1
Comparing PWYP and EITI
Scale Governance EI Value Chain
PWYP International
National
Limited subnational
Mandatory
Voluntary
Company payments and government
revenues
Government expenditures
Contracts and licensing procedures
EITI National
Limited subnational
Voluntary Company payments and government
revenues
tory.31 Thus, the PWYP seeks to inºuence mandatory regulatory reform, while
the EITI promotes voluntary and incremental reform.
Each initiative engages primarily at the national scale, but PWYP also
seeks to inºuence extraterritorial transparency-based regulation. For example, in
2011, after sustained PWYP campaigning, the G-8 endorsed mandatory disclo-
sure of oil, gas, and mining payments to governments.32 This endorsement fol-
lowed the passage of the US Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act in July 2010, also an advocacy objective of PWYP, which requires oil
and mining companies listed with US stock exchanges to report their payments
to the US and foreign governments. In addition, in June 2013, the European
Parliament voted in favor of the new EU transparency and accounting directives,
which will require extractive ªrms to publish all payments over £100,000 to
governments wherever they operate.33
Limitations of Transparency in Resource Governance
Although the EITI and PWYP coalitions have made signiªcant progress in a vari-
ety of countries, a number of limitations remain. First, the assumption that
more information is better does not always hold. The implementation of trans-
parency does not always achieve its desired result,34 and studies have found that
despite the EITI auditing requirement, member states and companies may not
produce complete and reliable data.35 Second, the dynamics between the pow-
erful and powerless are highly relevant. The lack of a strong domestic civil soci-
ety that can fully participate in the EITI process may hinder the effectiveness of
revenue transparency, and there may be differing perspectives from government,
industry, and civil society on its aims and objectives.36 In many EITI countries,
the public and legislators may not even be aware of EITI.37 Third, there is limited
evidence about how revenue transparency contributes to resource-led develop-
ment. More contested options, such as mandatory restrictions or regulation,
may be politically precluded.38 Transparency in resource governance is also
not likely to challenge the political and economic structural constraints charac-
teristic of extractive contexts,39 nor will it function successfully without certain
preconditions, such as an independent media and an active and free civil soci-
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revenue management and allocation; and sustainable development policies and projects (see
Alba 2009).
31. Alba 2009.
32. PWYP 2011.
33. PWYP 2013.
34. Fung et al. 2007.
35. Dykstra 2011; Gillies 2011; Ravat and Ufer 2010.
36. Smith et al. 2012.
37. Aaronson 2011.
38. Hauºer 2010.
39. Benner and Soares de Oliveira 2010.
ety.40 This analysis will consider these three critiques of transparency in the con-
text of Ghana’s emerging petroleum sector.
Institutionalizing Transparency in Ghana’s Extractive Sector
Although small-scale commercial oil production began in the 1970s in Ghana,
oil exploration only intensiªed in the 2000s, resulting in the discovery of an off-
shore oil ªeld (the Jubilee ªeld) with predicted reserves of 660 million barrels
in 2007.41 Commercial oil production began in the Jubilee ªeld by December
2010, with production averaging 66,000 barrels per day in 2011. This, however,
was nearly 50 percent below the predicted plateau of 120,000 barrels per day by
August 2011.42 Further exploration is ongoing, and it is likely that Ghana will
produce 250,000 barrels per day by 2013 or 2014, placing it in the top six pro-
ducers in sub-Saharan Africa.43 Expectations of development beneªts are on
the rise, particularly in the Western Region, with the Jubilee ªeld located just
60 kilometers offshore. An Anglo-Irish company, Tullow Ghana Limited, is
leading a consortium of partners in coordinating the development of the Jubi-
lee ªeld and implementing the partners’ corporate social responsibility strategy.
Some scholars remain optimistic that Ghana’s hydrocarbon resources
can contribute to broad-based development and poverty alleviation, particu-
larly with proper governance frameworks in place.44 Compared with the top oil
producers in sub-Saharan Africa—Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea,
Congo-Brazzaville, and Gabon—Ghana’s starting point is very different.
Ghana is the darling of donors, with an enviable record of a peaceful and
stable democracy. With economic growth rates consistently exceeding 6 percent
in recent years, it is making good progress towards becoming a middle-income
country by 2015.45 Ghana ranks sixty-fourth on Transparency International’s
2012 Corruption Perceptions Index and ªfty-eighth in the 2012 Freedom of the
Press Index. However, it remains 135 out of 186 countries on the UNDP 2012
Human Development Index.46 Its primary export commodities include cocoa,
gold, timber, and now oil. Oil production has grown from zero contribution to
GDP in 2009 to 6.9 percent of GDP in 2012.47 Although this article does not di-
rectly address whether dependency on oil and mineral rents is negatively im-
pacting upon the competitiveness of other sectors, this issue needs to be
watched carefully.
26 • Transparency in Resource Governance
40. Frynas 2009.
41. Tullow Oil 2012.
42. Tullow Oil 2011.
43. Oxfam America 2011.
44. Cavnar 2008. The Economist. “A Bonanza Beckons.” March 31, 2010.
45. CIDA 2011.
46. UNDP 2013.
47. GSS 2012.
Institutionalizing the PWYP and EITI in Ghana
One of the unique aspects about Ghana is that it had already established an ac-
tive PWYP coalition and was an EITI candidate country for its mining sector
when offshore oil was discovered in 2007. In June 2003, Ghana announced it
would be the ªrst country to pilot EITI in its mining sector, and in October 2010
Ghana’s mining sector was successfully validated and designated EITI compli-
ant. Transparency within Ghana’s extractives sector goes hand in hand with the
privatization and liberal reform that the mining industry has undergone since
the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, prior to EITI implementation, members of the
Chamber of Mines (i.e., the mining companies) voluntarily disclosed informa-
tion on royalty, tax, and ground rent payments to the media.48 Ghana’s embrace
of the liberal norms of governance by disclosure, coupled with a relatively free
media and long tradition of civil society engagement in public affairs, has pro-
vided the space for transparency in resource governance to ºourish.49
The interplay between PWYP-Ghana and the Ghana EITI (GHEITI) dem-
onstrates the important role that civil society has played in GHEITI’s insti-
tutionalization process. In 2004, civil society groups adopted a framework
for engagement with GHEITI that aligned with the PWYP global campaign for
transparency in extractive sector revenues. PWYP-Ghana was formally launched
in 2006 with 50 members and an agreed plan of action to engage in capacity-
building activities in the mining regions.50 PYWP-Ghana galvanized the public
to engage with the GHEITI process through regional workshops, engagement
around EITI reports, and sponsoring community members to participate in the
National Conference on EITI.51 Early in the implementation process, Ghana
demonstrated EITI candidate country best practice by extending its report re-
quirements to sub-national revenue ºows.52 Thus, the institutionalization of
GHEITI and voluntary revenue transparency mechanisms for the mining sector
were well on their way when the Jubilee ªeld was discovered in 2007.
In 2009, GHEITI’s National Steering Committee began meeting with
ofªcials from the Ministry of Energy to discuss extending the initiative to oil and
gas. This expansion was completed in August 2010, when the GHEITI National
Steering Committee was restructured to include oil, gas, and mining stake-
holders.53 The publication of the ªrst GHEITI report with oil and gas sector data
(the 2010/11 EITI audit reports) was launched in April 2013.54 Thus, it is too
early to assess the actual impact of the disclosure of company payments and
James Van Alstine • 27
48. Nguyen-Thanh and Schnell 2009.
49. Star-Ghana 2011.
50. ISODEC 2009b.
51. ISODEC 2009b.
52. Nguyen-Thanh and Schnell 2009.
53. EITI 2011.
54. GHEITI 2012.
government oil revenues. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to explore to what ex-
tent transparency “informs, empowers and improves” resource governance.55
Sensitization as Proxy for Empowerment
One of the key words arising in this institutionalization process is
“sensitization”—educating and informing multiple stakeholders about trans-
parency in resource governance. With the newly discovered oil in 2007, PWYP-
Ghana embarked on a sensitization campaign to inform the public about the
pitfalls and opportunities in applying the transparency agenda throughout the
extractive industries value chain. The Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas
(CSPOG) emerged as another key actor in March 2010 to unite civil society un-
der one banner. CSPOG is a broad coalition with about 120 members, includ-
ing civil society organizations, academic and research institutions, and individ-
uals. PWYP-Ghana hosts the CSPOG secretariat.
CSPOG seeks to provide a common voice for civil society, yet does not
want to compete with its individual members. Its remit therefore, is not to cam-
paign but to focus on advocacy. As one interviewee noted, “CSPOG I’m not sure
is aimed at engaging civil society. They welcome civil society to join so that the
Platform will have a common front to engage government.”56 Such a govern-
ment-centric engagement strategy is conªrmed by a member of the CSPOG sec-
retariat, who noted, “We incorporate citizens’ demands in all petitions and po-
sitions papers we send to the government and parliament.”57
International norms and ideas inform CSPOG’s activities, through its
strong engagement with PWYP, the Revenue Watch Institute, Oxfam America,
and others. It seeks public inputs through workshops and public forums,
e-petitions (SMS, emails, etc.), and radio and television discussions. It issues
memorandums and reports to lobby government actors on the emerging oil
and gas regulatory framework. As one interviewee highlighted, “GHEITI is not
able to put pressure on politicians the same way as CSPOG.”58 Where CSPOG
seeks to advocate to government on behalf of civil society, PWYP-Ghana com-
plements CSPOG by operating as an advocacy and campaigning organization.
As a CSPOG member noted, “PWYP plays a watchdog role on the EITI, mobiliz-
ing civil society to make demands of the EITI and this has been very successful.”
This complementary action is crucial for the institutionalization of the transpar-
ency and resource governance agenda in Ghana.
Numerous capacity-building and information-sharing workshops have
been held targeting members of Parliament, traditional and municipal authori-
ties, media, and the public. For example, CSGPOG consolidated views and posi-
tions after a citizens’ summit on oil and gas in June 2010 organized by Oxfam
America and the World Bank, and issued a communiqué to the government
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56. Interview with CSPOG member, September 27, 2011.
57. Email correspondence with member of CSPOG secretariat, July 4, 2011.
58. Interview with founder of an oil sector watchdog organization, June 11, 2011.
about the petroleum regulatory framework, the petroleum revenue manage-
ment bill, and the local content/local participation policy.
These organizations have also published inºuential reports that have
gained international media attention and raised the proªle of the debate. For
example, the report titled Ghana’s Big Test—Oil’s Challenge to Democratic Develop-
ment was published by the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISODEC)
and Oxfam America in January 2009,59 and CSPOG published the Readiness Re-
port Card in April 2011 in conjunction with Oxfam America. This measured the
performance not only of Ghana’s government in managing the challenges of the
emerging oil sector but also of development partners such as the World Bank,
the IMF, industry, and civil society itself.60 The report was launched in Accra,
London, and Washington DC.61
Ghana has also emerged as a central node in a regional extractive-
industries capacity-building process. The Ghana Institute of Management and
Public Administration hosts the African Regional Extractive Industries Knowl-
edge Hub. This organization has organized summer schools on governing oil,
gas, and mining revenues every July since 2009, co-sponsored by the Revenue
Watch Institute and the German Organization for Technical Cooperation
(GTZ). The sessions target “oversight actors” (civil society activists, members of
Parliament, and journalists) as well as local government ofªcials from resource
rich countries across sub-Saharan Africa.62
This sensitization and advocacy strategy by CSPOG and PWYP-Ghana
informs, but the extent to which it empowers remains to be seen. One question
that deserves further scrutiny is how “civil society” or “the public” is deªned in
this context. It is apparent that an active and mobilized civil society and media
exists on issues related to transparency in resource governance, but to what ex-
tent is this conªned to NGOs based in Accra? To what extent are civil society or-
ganizations and community leaders engaged in these debates in the Western
Region?
CSPOG does include a few members from the Western Region, and sensi-
tization workshops and public forums have been organized in the oil-bearing
region.63 A regional NGO called Friends of the Nation has helped facilitate the
establishment of community environmental monitoring and advocacy groups
(CEMAGs) in the Western Region. CSPOG consults CEMAGs on regional issues
through the Friends of the Nation. Yet the interaction between CSPOG and
Western Region communities focuses on government engagement as opposed
to community and local development strategies:
We facilitate communication between government and frontline communi-
ties. We do this by empowering communities to develop petitions which we
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take to the government and parliament and defend these views on behalf of
the communities.64
Although beyond the scope of this article, the extent to which these peti-
tions introduce new community-driven ideas into this institutionalization pro-
cess is worthy of further scrutiny. Multiple interviewees highlighted illiteracy
and lack of education as barriers to community engagement, which limits its in-
clusion in the broader transparency agenda:
Most of the local based organizations do not have the requisite skills to un-
derstand and articulate issues of revenues and expenditures, hence they are
unable to participate in priority setting for spending oil revenues (illiteracy
is high). Our Platform has developed some models to monitor the Petro-
leum Funds but local communities have little understanding of these
models.65
In the Western Region communities, there appears to be one-way informa-
tion sharing through the sensitization workshops and media outlets such as ra-
dio programs. The members of CSPOG and PWYP-Ghana may be empowered
through their advocacy strategies. However, moving beyond sensitization to em-
powering the public, particularly in the Western Region, faces signiªcant
hurdles.
There is also a lack of incentive for Western Region communities to engage
in these national-level policy debates. Although GHEITI intends to empower lo-
cal people to own the process, this applies only to the mining sector where sub-
national royalties are distributed to local authorities and traditional authorities.
Although GHEITI wants to extend this process to the oil and gas sector, the pe-
troleum management bill does not allow sub-national earmarking of reve-
nues.66 Oil-bearing communities have less incentive to engage with transpar-
ency in resource governance than do mining communities.67
Finally, transparency’s empowerment potential depends upon striking a
balance between conºict and consensus in its institutionalization process.
CSPOG encourages consensus among stakeholders as much as possible. The
Ghana Readiness Report Card assessed the performance of all stakeholders
through a multi-stakeholder validation process that sought consensus. The EITI
conference in 2011 also stressed that EITI seeks consensus in establishing its
rules and promoting in-country implementation. However, conºicting views ex-
ist among GHEITI secretariat staff,68 as do diverging interests at the community
level.69 Transparency may help to empower traditionally marginalized groups
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within frontline communities by highlighting the existence of conºicting views
on key issues.
The Interplay between Voluntary and Mandatory Transparency Initiatives
The process of institutionalizing transparency within the oil and gas sector has
informed and to a limited extent empowered certain stakeholders. The question
remains to what extent it has improved resource governance. As Dr. David
Nguyen-Thanh of the GTZ cautioned “. . . the measure of success is not the num-
ber of workshops and seminars organized but the creation of benchmarks to
measure costs and beneªts of training over time, and the inºuence of various ac-
tors in improving the lives of individuals and communities.”70
One potential measure of success at the national level is the extent to
which PWYP-Ghana and CSPOG have moved beyond the voluntary remit of
GHEITI to engage with mandatory policy and legislative initiatives throughout
the oil industry value chain. There is an opportunity for new oil sector laws to
substantively improve the lives of individuals and communities. As of June
2013, however, the oil sector legal framework is incomplete. It may be too early
to measure its actual impact, but substantial progress has been made in address-
ing revenue transparency, contract and licensing transparency, and to a lesser ex-
tent the implementation of a local content strategy.
On revenue transparency, the petroleum and revenue management bill
was passed in 2011, and CSPOG successfully lobbied for broader participation
in the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) tasked with moni-
toring compliance with it. Civil society leaders hailed Ghana’s petroleum reve-
nue management act as one of the best in the world because of its transparency
provisions and citizen oversight.71 As Mohammed Amin Adam, oil coordinator
for PWYP-Ghana, highlighted:
. . . I’m happy to mention that about 15 recommendations that we made to
government to improve and develop a transparent process of managing oil
revenues were all taken on board by the government, and they all are in the
revenue management law as we speak today.72
Ghana’s revenue management law goes beyond the EITI voluntary agenda
by including transparency and accountability about expenditures in addition to
revenue transparency. If well implemented, these early regulatory successes
bode well for more substantive effects of transparency in resource governance.
A proposed EITI bill, which has strong support from CSPOG and the Min-
istry for Finance and Economic Planning, also demonstrates this shift from vol-
untary to mandatory forms of revenue transparency. Proponents argue that it
will complement rather than duplicate Ghana’s revenue management law, by
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extending the scope of the current EITI initiative to include forestry and ªsheries
in addition to minerals and petroleum. It will also include payments made to
and received by district assemblies and traditional authorities.73
Civil society leaders achieved another regulatory success in 2011, when the
petroleum commission act was established. This law moves the power to regu-
late the industry and issue new contracts and licenses from the Ghana National
Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) to the Petroleum Commission, a newly estab-
lished independent regulator. However, the relationship between the GNPC and
Petroleum Commission still needs clariªcation, as the regulations of the law are
yet to be developed.74 Contract and license transparency has become a top advo-
cacy objective for PWYP and other civil society groups.
After the success of the petroleum revenue management act, civil society
has increased the pressure on members of Parliament to close transparency gaps
in how revenue is generated. This resulted in the petroleum exploration and
production bill ªrst being submitted to Parliament and then withdrawn for re-
packaging. Civil society leaders felt that it lacked transparency. They hoped the
delay would bring positive changes and lobbied for a contract disclosure re-
quirement as well as a competitive bidding process for allocating oil conces-
sions to be included in the bill.75 As of March 2013, the bill is still in limbo.76
Interestingly, the debate on contract transparency in Ghana’s oil sector
highlights the inºuence of extraterritorial legislation. The Jubilee Field contracts
were disclosed in 2011 not because of civil society or donor advocacy but be-
cause Kosmos disclosed its contract and joint production agreements due to its
initial public offering at the US Securities and Exchange Commission.77 This ac-
tion forced the Ghanaian government and Tullow Oil, with further civil society
pressure, to also disclose these contracts.78
Finally, a local content bill has been drafted with input from civil society
groups. Local content aims to increase participation of Ghanaians through di-
rect employment and contracts in the petroleum sector’s supply chain. The bill
seeks to establish a local content fund to build capacity of domestic suppliers
and service companies and a local content committee with civil society repre-
sentation, which will report to the Petroleum Commission.79 However, the sub-
stantive impact of this proposed legislation may be limited by corruption and
patronage relating to locally awarded contracts, agreeing on realistic targets for
local content participation, and deªning what is “local.”80
The above discussion reveals an interesting trend regarding the interaction
32 • Transparency in Resource Governance
73. Boyeªo 2012.
74. Gary 2012.
75. Oxfam America 2011.
76. Ghana Business News. “Ghana Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill Soon for Parliament,”
March 18, 2013.
77. Revenue Watch Institute 2011.
78. Public Agenda 2011.
79. Star-Ghana 2012.
80. Star-Ghana 2012.
between soft and hard law. At least at the national level, the transparency
agenda has moved well beyond voluntary disclosure of payments and revenue
by ªrms and government. Instead, it has entered the legislative framework that
will govern petroleum revenue management and possibly exploration, produc-
tion, and local content. This is signiªcant, given that some scholars have cau-
tioned that the normative transparency agenda may seek to scale back manda-
tory regulation nationally and internationally.81 Here, soft law appears instead
to have inºuenced hard law, which conªrms alternative academic perspectives
that argue that voluntary and mandatory disclosure initiatives often interact in
practice and are more complementary than competitive.82
Although civil society engagement with the emerging regulatory frame-
work has secured some initial successes, limitations to the transparency and
governance agenda at the national level remain. These include lack of a long-
term national development plan; a weak oil spill response plan; no strategic en-
vironmental assessment for the oil and gas sector; lack of technical capacity in
Parliament to scrutinize contracts and monitor the oil and gas industry; no
guidelines of how oil and gas revenues ªt into the overall budget and how that
budget will be managed; and the potential to have national security exemptions
in the freedom of information bill that is now pending in Parliament.83 It is
likely that as the petroleum laws are passed, civil society’s focus will turn from
lobbying and advocacy to compliance as well as social and environmental mon-
itoring and evaluation.84 Here lies the true test of how transparency in resource
governance will improve the lives of individuals and communities.
Transparency Initiatives at and between Multiple Scales
As is evident from the discussion above, the transparency and disclosure agenda
has had limited inºuence beyond national-level regulation and civil society
“sensitization” and capacity-building activities. Figure 1 outlines various di-
mensions of transparency in resource governance within the context of Ghana’s
emerging oil and gas sector, which helps to illustrate the multi-scale dimension
of resource governance and the interaction between voluntary and mandatory
governance mechanisms.
The “transparency in resource governance agenda” driven by civil society,
donors, media, and industry (e.g., contract disclosure by Kosmos) has targeted
the government of Ghana, particularly GNPC and Parliament. Substantive
change to policy and regulation has even been made at the national level. How-
ever, GHEITI has not been extended to the sub-national level for the oil and gas
sector (because there is to be “no statutory earmarking” of oil revenues, as there
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is with mining rents). Furthermore, the PWYP-Ghana campaign appears to have
done little at the local level beyond information sharing and capacity building.
The quantity and quality of advocacy and training at the national level is
signiªcant. However, there is limited activity at the sub-national level. Tullow
and government agencies have held public consultations in the Western Region,
and Tullow and the Jubilee partners have made corporate social responsibility
investments.85 Even though CEMAGs have been established in each district, it
remains to be seen to what extent transparency and accountability mechanisms
will be institutionalized at the local level. There is a signiªcant opportunity for
civil society organizations and development partners to ªll this gap.
In response to growing concern, the government announced it would set
up the Western Corridor Development Authority to address development issues
in the region, but local civil society leaders remain skeptical that this interven-
tion would confront the speciªc issues of concern.86 The extent to which trans-
parency in resource governance has inºuenced substantive outcomes locally is a
highly relevant point for traditional authorities and local leaders in the Western
Region, as Nana Ama Yirrah stressed:
So we on the Civil Society Platform are saying that, yes, the laws are impor-
tant. The legislation to guide oil exploration and production, oil revenue,
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Figure 1
Dimensions of Resource Governance
and revenue management are important. But what is even of more impor-
tance to us is to see how this generation of revenue . . . this protection of
the revenue sources translates into development—real development for the
people.87
A second signiªcant ªnding is the interaction between voluntary and
mandatory transparency initiatives and the concept of scale. Through active civil
society engagement and advocacy, a dynamic institutionalization process has
rescaled authority away from voluntary practices towards binding policy and
regulation. Processes of scaling and rescaling are indicative of the structural con-
text within which the move from “government to governance” and the diffusion
of transparency and disclosure norms has taken place. As Hauºer highlights, the
transparency agenda sits quite comfortably alongside the “neoliberal norms of
market efªciency and bureaucratic rationality.”88 The revenue transparency
agenda is arguably a reformist initiative seeking only incremental change,89 yet
it can also be viewed as an important ªrst step in the governance of resource
extraction.
This move from voluntary to mandatory regulation brings with it risks and
opportunities concerning who exercises authority, and the extent to which au-
thority holders are transparent and accountable to Ghanaian citizens. At the na-
tional level, there are concerns, among other things, about the extent to which
the freedom of information bill will be subject to national security exemptions
for the petroleum industry, as well as whether the petroleum exploration and
production bill will embrace contract transparency and a competitive bidding
process. At the international level, the US’s Dodd-Frank Act may require US-
listed oil companies to disclose its payments to the Ghanaian government.
While Ghana is already participating in the EITI, this is an example of how ex-
traterritorial legislation may rescale authority. While this hard law may beneªt
both Ghanaian and US citizens, Ghanaians are not the intended beneªciaries.
Conclusions and the Road Ahead
With its track record of multi-party politics, a relatively free media, and an active
and engaged civil society, Ghana is uniquely positioned among African oil pro-
ducers to mitigate “resource curse” impacts. Its experience with implementing
GHEITI in its mining sector has enabled an accelerated learning process within
its nascent oil sector. Since 2007, transparency activism has inºuenced the up-
take of a range of voluntary and mandatory institutional initiatives throughout
the oil sector’s value chain. These include extending GHEITI to the oil and gas
sector; including transparency and accountability objectives within the petro-
leum revenue management act and petroleum commission act; campaigning
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for contract transparency and other provisions to be included in the petroleum
exploration and production bill; and increasing information sharing, training,
and capacity building on resource governance.
This article highlights two key themes, which should inform future analy-
ses of transparency and accountability in the extractive industries: (1) the inter-
action between voluntary and mandatory governance mechanisms and subse-
quent rescaling of authority; and (2) the multi-scale dimension of resource
governance, and subsequent lack of focus on sub-national issues.
Revenue disclosure has not been the “default option” in Ghana,90 but has
been one of a variety of pathways to institutionalize transparency throughout
the extractive industries value chain. Although some substantive changes have
been made, signiªcant challenges remain. These include the underrepresenta-
tion of the norms of transparency, accountability and the institutionalization of
community beneªts in the Western Region and weak environmental monitor-
ing and enforcement. Furthermore, the petroleum exploration and production
bill and the freedom of information bill are both stalled in Parliament, with
civil society concerned that transparency mechanisms within these pieces of leg-
islation may be compromised.
Concern has also been raised in the literature that lack of strong domestic
civil society may hinder the effectiveness of revenue transparency, and that the
difªculties in agreeing upon a shared vision of EITI within participating coun-
tries may impact negatively upon its effectiveness. The evidence from Ghana
suggests that civil society has spoken with a common voice, particularly at the
national-level on the emerging petroleum sector and has actively and strategi-
cally engaged with transparency within the framework of GHEITI and through-
out the extractive industries value chain. Transparency in resource governance is
having some success, but it is too early to judge whether it has been
transformational. Future research should assess the extent to which the imple-
mentation of GHEITI in multiple sectors is having substantive pro-poor devel-
opment impacts.
Ghana’s role as the key node for extensive knowledge sharing within a
growing transnational network of civil society activists, development partners,
and other stakeholders is promising. New petro-states such as Uganda and
Kenya in East Africa have modeled civil society collective action on Ghana’s
CSPOG and aspire to become EITI candidate countries. Future research should
also address the extent to which Ghana’s lessons are transferable to other
resource-rich countries within and beyond sub-Saharan Africa.
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